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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
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Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed
question of law and fact. Any underlying factual
determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous
standard of review. The ultimate conclusion as
to whether Appellant was subjected to custodial
interrogation in the absence of probable cause
requires a review for correctness. See State v.
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993).
2.

Did the trial cour t err in denying Appel lant's motion

to suppress evidence based oi i an unlawful detention and arrest, in

violation of the fourth amendment?
Standard of Review; This issue involves a mixed
question of law and fact. Any underlying factual
determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous
standard of review. The ultimate conclusion as
to whether Appellant was subjected to custodial
interrogation in the absence of probable cause
requires a review for correctness. See State v.
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information dated April 27, 1992, the State charged
Gary D. Hilfiker with one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a
first degree felony, and one count of Aggravated Arson, a first
degree felony.

R. 7.

Defendant/Appellant Hilfiker filed a "Motion to Suppress
Statements and All Evidence Secured Through Unlawful Arrest"
(R. 43-4), a "Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement to Police"
(R. 45-6), and a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
(R. 47-53).

See Addendum B for copies of motions to suppress

statements.
Following a hearing held on October 27 and November 2,
1992, the trial judge denied Appellant's motions.

A copy of the

transcript of the trial judge's denial of the motions is contained
in Addendum C.
Following a trial held on November 10-14, 1992, a jury
convicted Appellant of Homicide, a first degree felony, and
Aggravated Arson, a first degree felony, as charged in the
Information.

R. 97-8.
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On December 16, 1992, the trial judge entered judgment and
conviction, sentencing Appellant to two terms of five years to
life.

R. 146-7.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 24, 1992, at approximately 3:30 a.m., firefighters
were dispatched to a residence located at 434 Bryan Avenue.
R. 498. When they arrived, they saw that the house was "fully
involved in the fire" and "a number of people [were] standing
outside."

R. 499.
In the front room area, the firefighters found a hole about

three feet by four feet burned through the floor.

R. 500, 627.

Beneath the hole was the body of a woman, later identified as Marsha
Haverty.

R. 500, 528. The fire was unusual in that it had burned

down through the floor rather than up.

R. 506. A firefighter

testified that "for a floor to be burned out is very unusual unless
there has been accelerant poured on it."

R. 506.

Officers eliminated accidental causes for the fire.
R. 636.

A fire investigator believed that the fire was started by

an accelerant which they thought was kerosene.

R. 637.

The assistant medical examiner testified that Ms. Haverty
"had been stabbed and cut numerous times on the chest and her face
and her back," and that she believed Ms. Haverty had bled to death.
R. 653-4, 655, 674. Any burning injuries to the body occurred after
death.

R. 658.
One of the firefighters found a knife covered with blood on
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the lawn near the house.
with blood on it.

R. 519.

R. 544.

cement pad near the house.
blood on them.

A police officer found a jacket

Officers also located a bus parked on a
Both the bus and the cement pad had

R. 547.

Gary Hilfiker had been living with Marsha Haverty at the
Bryan Avenue house for a short period of time before her death.
R. 529. After the fire started, Gary was outside the house and
"quite concerned that there was somebody in the house."

R. 170.

Gary had blood on his shirt, shoes and socks, and a cut
hand.

R. 182.

First aid was administered to Gary at the scene,

then he was transported to Holy Cross Hospital.

R. 170.

Gary had a

cut through the palm of his hand which was stitched at the
hospital.

R. 171.

Officer Whitaker, who had arrived at the scene at about
4:00 a.m., left for Holy Cross Hospital at 4:24 a.m., arriving at
the hospital at 4:55 a.m.

R. 177, 171, 175. While Gary's hand was

being stitched, Officer Whitaker asked Appellant to tell him what
had happened.

R. 172. Gary told the officer that he had used his

hand to break a window.
hospital.

R. 172. Gary was not Mirandized at the

R. 179.

Jeff Long, a fire investigator, also went to Holy Cross
Hospital to question Gary.

R. 178.

Officer Whitaker received a call telling him to take Gary
to the Public Safety Building as the officer was driving away from
the hospital with Gary in his car.

R. 173. According to the

officer, Gary got excited and stated "that he was positive that they
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found her inside dead, and they'd think he did it."

R. 174. Gary

also told the officer that "he was quite tired, and that he wanted
to go home and get some sleep."

R. 175, 187. The officer indicated

that Gary then "said he'd be willing to talk to somebody."

R. 175.

Officer Whitaker arrived at the police station with Gary at
about 6:05 or 6:10 a.m. and went to a room in the robbery division.
R. 175, 183. When Homicide Detective Howell arrived, they moved to
an interrogation room.

R. 184, 189.

Officer Whitaker stayed with

Appellant in the interview room until the officer's shift ended at
about 8:05 a.m.

R. 177, 185.

sleep.

Officer Whitaker did not know whether Gary was in

R. 185.

During those two hours, Gary did not

pain but indicated that the local anesthetic administered by the
doctor might have been wearing off.

R. 185.

Before Detective Howell began questioning Gary, Officer
Whitaker told the detective the information the officer had obtained
from Gary.

R. 188.

to search form.

Detective Howell asked Gary to sign a consent

R. 186.

Detective Howell did not Mirandize Gary

during his initial interrogation.

After passing the information

obtained during that initial session to officers at the scene,
Detective Howell returned to the interrogation room.
Detective Howell read Gary his Miranda rights.

At that point,

R. 205, 214-5.

Homicide Detective Howell had gone to the house on Bryan
Avenue at about 5:00 a.m. to investigate a fire fatality.

R. 190.

He was shown the knife with blood on it and the blood on three
vehicles and the house.

R. 191. He also saw the body and burn

pattern "which, according to the fire department and from [his]
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experience, could possibly have been related to an accelerant being
used to start this fire,"

R. 191.

Detective Howell had also

received information from Investigator Long regarding the statements
made by Gary to the investigator at the hospital.

R. 192.

After Detective Howell questioned Gary the second time, the
detective returned to the scene.

R. 234-5.

Detective Howell turned

Gary over to Homicide Detective Alcock at about 7:30 a.m.
R. 234-5.

Detective Alcock informed Appellant of his Miranda rights

and began interviewing Appellant at approximately 7:43 a.m.

R. 236.

At about 9:20 a.m., Detective Alcock indicated that the
officers wanted to take the clothing Appellant was wearing and that
they would try to locate other clothing for him to wear.

R. 237-8.

Detective Alcock also requested that he be able to draw some blood
from Appellant for comparison purposes.

R. 238-9.

At that point, Appellant requested an attorney.

R. 239.

According to Detective Alcock, he "terminated the
interview" when Appellant asked for an attorney.

R. 239.

Detective

Timmerman, who was also present during the interview, made a brief
statement to Appellant after Appellant's request for counsel.
R. 239-40.
The detectives did not provide counsel to Gary or let him
leave the police station or book him into jail.

Instead, they

continued to hold Gary at the police station; Detective Alcock
accompanied Gary to the police station cafeteria because Gary had
indicated he was hungry.

R. 240-1. Although Detective Alcock did

not question Appellant during breakfast, he conversed with Appellant

- 6

-

about mutual acquaintances and the detective's responsibilities for
doing taxi cab inspections while the detective worked in the Motor
Carrier Enforcement Group.

R. 241-2.

After 45 minutes to an hour in the cafeteria, Detective
Alcock returned Gary to the homicide interrogation room and closed
the door.

R. 242-3.

Gary remained alone in that room for several

minutes, then Detective Alcock returned to the room in order to get
Gary's clothing.

R. 243. At the hearing on the motion to suppress,

Detective Alcock testified that he did not recall saying anything
when he reentered the interrogation room, but he may have said,
"hey, Gary."

According to the detective, Gary then stated, "I want

to tell you what really happened last night.
anymore."

I can't live with this

R. 244. At trial, Detective Alcock testified that he

"opened the door to the interview room and stepped in to say, 'Gary/
you know, we've located some clothing.
get it.

I am going to go down and

I will be right back.' At which time [Gary] says, 'I need

to talk to you.'"

R. 723.

Detective Alcock left, obtained a tape recorder and spoke
with Detective Howell, then returned to the interrogation room at
about 10:15 a.m.

R. 245.

Once the tape recorder was on, Detective

Alcock questioned Gary about his request for counsel, and Gary
indicated that he was talking to the detective "by my choice."
R. 249.
Thereafter, Gary made a statement to officers indicating
that he had stabbed Ms. Haverty and started the fire.

A copy of the

transcript of that statement is contained in the court record as
State's Exhibit 37.
- 7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant made a clear request for counsel.

Officers did

not provide him with counsel, and Appellant did not thereafter
initiate further questioning nor intelligently, knowingly or
voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Any statements made after
Appellant invoked his right to counsel should have been suppressed.
Officers detained Appellant for custodial questioning
without having probable cause to arrest him.

Because no attenuation

occurred between the illegal arrest and subsequent statements, all
statements made by Appellant after he was detained should have been
suppressed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION VIOLATED
THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND MIRANDA V.
ARIZONA.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States constitution
provides in part:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could best
be protected by requiring officers to inform individuals prior to
custodial interrogation that they had certain rights.
The prosecution may not use any statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of [a] defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
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effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination.
• • •

Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444-5, the Court stated
that if an accused "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning."

The Court clarified that:

The mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain
from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned.
Id. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; see State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965,
968 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445.
Once an accused has requested the assistance of counsel, he
"is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police."

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct.

1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), rehearing denied, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69
L.Ed.2d 984.
The rule in Edwards requires:
First, courts must determine whether the accused
actually invoked his right to counsel . . .
Second, if the accused invoked his right to
counsel, courts may admit his responses to
further questioning only on finding that he
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(a) initiated further discussions with the
police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently
waived the right he invoked.
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488
(1984) (per curiam).
In State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court articulated the test for determining whether
statements are admissible after an accused has invoked his right to
counsel.
[A]n accused's statements made after he has
invoked his right to counsel and before counsel
is made available to him are admissible if three
conditions are satisfied. First, it must be the
accused, not the law enforcement officers, who
initiates the conversations in which the
incriminating statements are made. Second, the
prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress,
a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel. Third, the accused's statements must be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have
been voluntarily made.
Moore, 697 P.2d at 236; see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,
103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion).

"[W]hen

an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised
of his rights . . . ."

State v. Newton# 682 P.2d 295, 297 (Utah

1984), quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485.
The Miranda Court clarified that the burden of proof is on
the prosecution, M[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence, obtained as a
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result of interrogation can be used against him."
at 479.

Miranda, 384 U.S.

The Court described the state's burden to prove waiver as a

"heavy burden."

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.

"The Courts must presume

that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden
is great"; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct.
1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355, 357
(Utah 1980).

A court will examine the "totality of the

circumstances" in order to properly determine whether the right to
counsel has been properly waived.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,

106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986).

That

determination will depend "upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused.'"

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482,

quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82
L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
In the present case, Appellant requested an attorney at
about 9:20 a.m.

R. 202, 236, 239.1

The trial judge found that

Appellant asked for an attorney at about the time the officer
requested that he submit to a blood draw.

R. 284. Hence, Appellant

clearly invoked his right to counsel.
A review of the circumstances demonstrates that Appellant
did not initiate further discussions with police after invoking his
right to counsel.

See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 95; State v.

1. Detective Howell believed that at 9:30 a.m., he had discussions
"that [he] would probably be arresting Mr. Hilfiker." R. 228. This
is also the time at which Detective Howell was informed Mr. Hilfiker
requested an attorney. R. 202.

- 11 -

Moore, 697 P.2d at 236.

After Gary indicated he wanted an attorney,

Officer Timmerman made a brief statement to him.

R. 239.2

After

the Timmerman discussion, the officers "terminated" the interview.
R. 239.
Despite the "termination" of the interview, Detective
Alcock remained with Gary at the police station.

R. 239-40.

Detective Alcock accompanied Gary to the police station cafeteria.
R. 240-1. About 45 minutes to an hour later, the detective returned
Gary to the homicide interrogation room and closed the door.
R. 242-3.
Detective Alcock left Gary alone in the interrogation room
for several minutes, then returned to get Gary's clothing.
723.

R. 243,

Although the detective's testimony at trial as to what he said

when he reentered the interrogation room differed from his testimony
at the motion hearing (compare R. 723, 243-4), it appears that the
officer communicated to Gary that he intended to take Gary's
clothing.

Despite Gary's request for counsel, he had not seen a

lawyer and had not been allowed to leave the police station either
to go home or be booked into jail.

From Appellant's perspective,

the request for counsel had done nothing to either make counsel
available to him or terminate the requirement that he remain in the
police station interrogation room and provide evidence to officers.
Detective Alcock testified that when he returned to the

2. The trial judge found that Officer Alcock asked "[a] few more
clarifying questions" after Appellant requested counsel. R. 284.
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interrogation room, Gary said that he needed3 to talk.

R. 723. At

that time, officers were continuing to hold Gary in the police
interrogation room and attempting to obtain his clothing as
evidence.

This situation is markedly different from the situation

where a suspect is placed in a cell after invoking his right to
counsel, then telephones police to initiate continued discussions.
See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236; State v. Archuleta, 209 Utah
Adv. Rep. 12, 14 (Utah 1993).
Instead, it is similar to the situation in Edwards where
officers returned to the defendant the day after he had requested
counsel, without having made counsel available to him.
at 388.

68 L.Ed.2d

The Court indicated in Edwards that the defendant was

subjected to "custodial interrogation . . . within the meaning of
Rhode Island v. Innis.11

Edwards v. Arizona, 68 L.Ed.2d at 388.

Although officers may have stopped directly questioning
Appellant, their actions in continuing to hold Gary and attempting
to obtain items of evidence from him created the same atmosphere as
that which is created by custodial questioning.

See Rhode Island v.

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
Gary was never allowed to leave the police station or nearby
presence of officers; therefore, his discussion with them was a
continuation of ongoing events and not an independent initiation as

3. At the motion hearing, the detective claimed that when he
reentered the interrogation room, Gary said, "I want to tell you
what really happened last night. I can't live with this anymore."
R. 243-4. At trial, the quote attributed to Gary at this juncture
was the less forceful, "I need to talk to you." R. 723.
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required by Edwards and Moore.
Nor did Gary knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel.
The determination of whether a waiver of the
right to counsel was made knowingly and
intelligently depends upon the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding the case, including
the background, experience and conduct of the
accused.
Moore, 697 P.2d at 236 (citation omitted).
[A] waiver must have been the product of a "'free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion or deception' and executed with 'full
awareness both of the nature of the right being
abandoned and [of] the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.'"
State v. Archuleta, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 14 (Utah 1993).
In the present case, Detective Alcock testified that Gary
indicated that he wanted to tell the officer what happened at about
10:15 a.m.

R. 244. At that point, Gary had been in police company,

if not custody, for six hours.

R. 171-2, 175, 177, 183, 188, 205.

Despite his request for counsel an hour or so earlier, no lawyer had
arrived and officers had not booked Gary into jail or let him go.
Detective Howell had made it clear two or so hours earlier that Gary
could not leave.
night.

R. 214.

Gary was fatigued, having been up all

Although the officer stated that Gary had indicated that it

was his choice to go forward, the remaining circumstances including
his fatigue and the continued, lengthy detention demonstrate that
Gary did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.
Finally, the circumstances indicate that Gary's statements
were not voluntary.

"The test of whether a confession is voluntary
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depends upon the totality of the circumstances."
236.

Moore, 697 P.2d at

The State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that the statement was voluntary.

State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300

(Utah 1992).
The test for voluntariness "is never mechanical, but must
duly consider both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation."

Allen, 839 P.2d at 300, citing

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988) (quoting United
States v. Gordon, 638 F.Supp. 1120, 1145 (W.D. La. 1986)).

"The

ultimate inquiry is, of course, whether physical or psychological
force or other improper threats or promises prompted the accused to
talk when he otherwise would not have done so."

Allen, 839 P.2d at

300.
A number of circumstances contributed to the lack of
voluntariness.

Gary was tired and asked if he could go home and

sleep before ever being taken to the police station.

R. 187. Gary

complained of fatigue during the interrogation and said he wanted to
go home.

R. 216.

He had sustained a severe cut to his hand which

required stitches; officers were unaware of whether he felt pain but
gave him aspirin at one point for his hand.

The unduly long period

of questioning coupled with continued detention after requesting
counsel and the apparent lack of an end to being held at the station
house also demonstrated the lack of voluntariness.
The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that any
statements made by Gary after he requested counsel should have been
suppressed.
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POINT II. THE CUSTODIAL QUESTIONING OF APPELLANT
IN THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF STATEMENTS.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution4
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in
pertinent part:
A peace officer may make an arrest under
authority of warrant or may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
. . .

(2) when he has reasonable cause to
believe a felony has been committed and has
reasonable cause to believe the person
arrested committed it.
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60
L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment requires that officers have probable cause in order
to detain an individual for custodial questioning.
216.

442 U.S. at

In Dunaway, an informant gave information to officers

suggesting that the defendant might have been involved in a
murder/robbery which occurred at a pizza parlor.

The officer told

other officers to "pick up" the defendant" and "bring him in."
at 203.

Id.

Three officers found the defendant and took him to the

4. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6
L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

- 16 -

police station and placed him in an interrogation room.

Although

the defendant was not formally arrested and the State claimed that
he voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station, the court
determined otherwise.
In reaching its decision that the detention required
probable cause, the Court compared the limited and "narrowly
circumscribed intrusions" which are allowed under Terry v. Ohiof 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny with
the detention of the defendant.

The Court pointed out that the

detention of the defendant "was in important respects
indistinguishable from a traditional arrest."

Dunaway, 442 U.S. at

212.
Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he
was found. Instead, he was taken from a
neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a
police station, and placed in an interrogation
room. He was never informed that he was "free to
go"; indeed, he would have been physically
restrained if he had refused to accompany the
officers or had tried to escape their custody.
The application of the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of probable cause does not depend on
whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed
an "arrest" under state law. The mere facts that
petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was
not "booked", and would not have had an arrest
record if the interrogation had proved fruitless,
while not insignificant for all purposes
[citation omitted], obviously does not make
petitioner's seizure even roughly analogous to
the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry
and its progeny.
The determination of whether a custodial interrogation
occurred is based on an objective test, "i.e., that 'the only
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position

- 17 -

would have understood his situation./,f

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d

1100 (Utah 1991), quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442,
104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), and citing Hunter v.
State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979) ("The question is not whether
the particular defendant considered himself in custody, but whether
a 'reasonable person [under the same circumstances] would feel he
was not free to leave and break off police questioning./M).
In Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court "restated four of the most important
factors in determining whether an accused who has not been formally
arrested is in custody."

Those factors are:

(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether
the investigation focused on the accused;
(3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were
present; and (4) the length and form of the
interrogation.
In Sampson, this Court found a fifth factor, "(5) whether
the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and
willingly," pertinent to the analysis.

Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105,

citing State v. Herrera, 621 P.2d 1209 (Or. App. 1980); see also
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Mirguet, 844 P.2d 995, 997-8 (Utah App. 1992).
Custodial interrogation includes "not only . . . express
questioning, but also any words or action on the part of the
police . . . that police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect."

Rhode Island v. Innis,

446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
Having determined that the custodial questioning of the
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defendant violated the Fourth Amendment, the Dunaway Court also
considered "whether the connection between this unconstitutional
police conduct and the incriminating statements and sketches
obtained during petitioner's illegal detention were sufficiently
attenuated to permit the use at trial."

Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216.

The burden of establishing that the illegality was not exploited
rests on the State.

442 U.S. at 218. Relying on Brown v. Illinois,

422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Court
articulated several factors to be considered in determining whether
"the statements were obtained by exploitation of the illegality of
his arrest."

422 US at 217.

The temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, the presence of intervening
circumstances, ... and, particularly, the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
In concluding that the statements were obtained by
exploiting the illegal arrest, the Court focused on the lack of
intervening circumstances and the fact that "the arrest without
probable cause had a 'quality of purposefulness' in that it was an
'expedition for evidence' admittedly undertaken 'in the hope that
something might turn up./M 442 U.S. at 218, quoting Brown, 422 U.S.
at 605.
The situation in this case is virtually a replica
of the situation in Brown. Petitioner was also
admittedly seized without probable cause in the
hope that something might turn up, and confessed
without any intervening event of significance,
[footnote omitted].
. . .

No intervening events broke the connection
between petitioner's illegal detention and his
confession. To admit petitioner's confession in
such a case would allow "law enforcement officers
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to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity,
safe in the knowledge that they could wash their
hands in the 'procedural safeguards' of the
Fifth."
442 U.S. at 219.
In Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 102 S.Ct. 1664, 73
L.Ed.2d 314 (1982), the Court also held that a confession obtained
through custodial interrogation should have been suppressed as the
fruit of the illegal arrest.

The Court indicated that obtaining an

arrest warrant after the defendant was taken into custody or
allowing the defendant to talk to his girlfriend were not
intervening events which broke "the connection between the illegal
arrest and the confession."

The Court also reaffirmed its

determinations in Brown and Dunaway that police conduct is flagrant
and purposeful and therefore suggests exploitation of the illegality
where officers "effectuate[] an investigatory arrest without
probable cause" in the hope of obtaining information.
693.

457 U.S. at

See also State v. Thurmanf 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah

1993) .
A review of the facts in the present case demonstrates that
(1) Appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation, (2) the
officers lacked probable cause to arrest, and (3) there was no
attenuation between the illegal arrest and subsequent statements so
as to permit admission of the statements.

A. APPELLANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION.
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1.

Site of the Interrogation

Although the questioning began at the scene then moved to
the hospital (R. 173, 178, 775, 778), Gary was ultimately
transported from the hospital to the police station at the request
of the homicide detective,

R. 195, 173, 195.5

When Officer Whitaker and Gary arrived at the police
station at about 6:05 a.m., they went to an office in the robbery
division.

R. 175, 183. However, when Homicide Detective Howell was

ready to question Gary, Appellant was moved to an "interview" or
interrogation room.

R. 184, 195.

Detective Howell had two conversations with Gary during a
45-minute period.

R. 691. After attempting to obtain consent to

search during the first conversation, Detective Howell stopped the
conversation so that he could converse with officers at the crime
scene.

R. 692.

Detective Howell Mirandized Appellant during the

second conversation.

R. 197. This was apparently the first time

Gary was Mirandized.
This Court has recognized that "[s]tation house questioning
lends itself to a finding of custody, . . . although that fact alone
is not conclusive."

Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105.

The continued

police escort and questioning from the time Appellant left the
scene, coupled with the ultimate arrival at the police station and

5. Detective Howell testified at the motion hearing that Officer
Whitaker radioed him from the hospital and "said that Mr. Hilfiker
was done with his treatment and that he was bringing him back to the
scene." R. 195. Detective Howell then requested that Whitaker take
Gary to the police station. R. 195.
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transfer to an "interview" room for further questioning,
demonstrates that Appellant was in custody from the moment he left
the hospital enroute to the police station, if not sooner.

2.

Focus of Investigation on the Accused

The investigation focused on Appellant shortly after the
fire.

Both Officer Whitaker and Arson Investigator Long went to the

hospital to question Gary.

R. 173, 178, 775, 778.

Investigator

Long's purpose in talking to Gary at the hospital was to find out
how the fire started; he asked Gary a number of questions including
whether Gary had started the fire.

R. 776, 778. At about

6:00 a.m., Detective Howell directed that Appellant be taken to the
police station rather than home after he finished at the hospital.
R. 195.
Detective Howell suspected a homicide and focused on
Appellant because of the bloody knife, bloody clothing, suspicious
burn pattern, the bloody jackets, and lack of forced entry, all of
which he was aware of while at the scene between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m.
R. 198.

Indeed, Detective Howell told Gary during Detective

Howell's second interview at about 7:00 a.m. that the detective did
not want to let Gary go until he got some idea of what happened.
R. 214.

3.

Indicia of Arrest

Although Appellant was not handcuffed, other indicia of
arrest were present.

As was the case in Sampson, Appellant was not

- 22 -

informed that he was free to leave.

In fact, when Officer Whitaker

told Gary of the request to go to the police station, Gary became
agitated.

R. 174. He indicated that he was tired and wanted to go

home to get some sleep.

R. 175. Nevertheless, Officer Whitaker

persisted in his "request" that Appellant go to the police station.
R. 175. A little while later, when Detective Howell was
interviewing Gary, Gary indicated that he was tired and wanted to go
home and sleep before being questioned by Detective Howell.
R. 216.

In his report, Detective Howell wrote that "the arrested

person indicated a desire to leave, so I detained him."

R. 216.

Detective Howell testified further that he did not let Appellant
leave at 7:15 a.m.

R. 222. A reasonable person in these

circumstances would not have believed he was free to leave.

4.

Length and Form of Questioning

Appellant was in police company from shortly after
4:00 a.m. until late morning.

He was repeatedly questioned at the

scene, the hospital, and the police station by various officers.
R. 170, 175, 176, 178, 775, 778, 234-5, 238-9.

Officers asked

Appellant to account for his whereabouts and early on, while still
at the hospital, asked whether he had started the fire.

R. 172.

The length and form of the questioning demonstrates the custodial
nature of the questioning.
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5. Whether Appellant Went to Police Station
Voluntarily
Finally, although Officer Whitaker testified that Appellant
agreed to go to the police station, the officer's testimony
demonstrates that Appellant did not "freely," "willingly" or
"voluntarily" go downtown.
Appellant downtown.

The officer had been requested to take

R. 173.

The officer's testimony regarding this

"request" suggests that it was not subject to the consent or
agreement of Appellant.

R. 173. When informed of the request, Gary

became agitated and said he wanted to go home and sleep.

R. 174-5.

Nevertheless, Officer Whitaker persisted in his "request" and drove
Gary to the police station.

This situation is markedly different

from that in Sampson where the defendant drove himself to the police
station but was nevertheless subjected to custodial interrogation.
A reasonable person in Gary's position would have believed
he was in custody from the moment Officer Whitaker turned his car in
the direction of the police station.

B. OFFICERS LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
APPELLANT.
An officer may arrest an individual without a
warrant either when he has reasonable cause to
believe a felony has been committed and that the
person arrested committed it or when the officer
has reasonable cause to believe the person has
committed a public offense and there is a
reasonable basis for believing the person will
destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of
the offense.
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986); see also Utah Code
Ann. § 77-7-2 (Supp. 1989); State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231 (Utah
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App. 1989).
Probable cause is determined by assessing the totality of
the circumstances from an objective standard.
1236.

Bartley, 784 P.2d at

The test is
whether from the facts known to the officer, and
the inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his
position would be justified in believing that the
suspect had committed the offense.

Bartley, 784 P.2d at 1236, citing State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125
(Utah 1983), et al.
In this case, the officers did not have probable cause to
arrest Gary.

Officer Whitaker knew that Gary was concerned that a

woman was inside the burning house.

R. 170. The officer was aware

of Gary's cut hand and the blood on his clothing and thought Gary's
explanation about how he hurt his hand had some inconsistencies.
R. 172.
At the time that Officer Whitaker was told to take Gary to
the police station, officers had found the body.

R. 191. They

found a knife outside the home with blood on it.

R. 191. They also

found blood on three vehicles, two jackets which appeared to have
blood on them, and what they considered to be a questionable burn
pattern from the fire.

R. 190, 191, 199, 519, 544, 547. Although

Gary had blood on him, his hand was severely cut.

Officer Whitaker,

who observed Gary and the blood, considered Gary a witness rather
than a suspect.

R. 187.

While the officers had information suggesting that a
homicide occurred, they did not have sufficient information
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suggesting that Gary had committed the homicide such that "a
reasonable and prudent person in his position would be justified in
believing that the suspect had committed the offense."

The lack of

probable cause to arrest Gary is emphasized by Detective Howell's
decision not to Mirandize Gary during the initial interview at the
police station, the delay until 9:30 a.m. in discussing a formal
arrest, and the failure to place Gary under arrest until after his
statement.

R. 188, 205, 214-5.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers did
not have probable cause to arrest Gary when they took him to the
police station and subjected him to custodial interrogation.

C. NO ATTENUATION OCCURRED BETWEEN THE ILLEGAL
ARREST AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS.
Finally, any statements made by Appellant must be
suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.

The custody and

interrogation involved in this case was ongoing from the time
Appellant left the scene until several hours later, while still
being questioned by officers.

Despite the fact that Appellant

apparently had not slept all night and indicated at about 6:00 a.m.
that he was tired and needed sleep, officers continued to hold and
question him until late morning, when they booked him into the
jail.

Officers did allow Appellant to eat at some point, but he was

accompanied by an officer throughout that meal.

R. 240.

Indeed,

even after Appellant requested counsel, officers continued to hold
him at the police station.

See discussion supra at 11-14.
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No

intervening event which broke "the connection between the illegal
arrest and the confession" occurred in this case.
In addition, it is apparent that the officers "effectuated
an investigatory arrest without probable cause" in the hope of
obtaining information from Appellant.

Hence, the police conduct was

flagrant and purposeful, demonstrating further that the illegality
was exploited.

See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 217; Thurman, 203

Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.
Officers arrested Appellant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

All statements made by Appellant flowed from that

violation and should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this

/ day of June, 1993.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

CONSTITUTION OF THE
TOUTED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
rnra UNITED
STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
eflects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly deyhhtng the place to be «JMtfr»h«ri ^d the persons
or things to be seized.

Const. Amend ^ reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against hi™; to have compulsory
process for. obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State «h«H make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

77-7-Z. X>y p e a c e u u ^ - e n .
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe, that the person arrested has
committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, oven
(f) appealsfroma court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
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424 East 500 South, Suite, 304V \JV-*
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
AND ALL EVIDENCE SECURED
THROUGH UNLAWFUL ARREST AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case N o . 921900991FS
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP

GARY D . HILFIKER,
Defendant.

MOTION
COMES NOW the defendant, GARY D . HILFIKER, by and through
his counsel of record, CANDICE A . JOHNSON and LESHIA LEE-DIXON and
respectfully move to suppress statements and all other derivative
evidence secured when defendant was subjected to an unlawful
detention and arrest without probable cause.

The defendant claims

that statements and other evidence seized from his person at the
police station were the product of the illegality of the defendant's
detention and unlawful arrest in violation of those protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendments of the Utah Constitution and
Article I §7 and §14 of the Utah State Constitution.

Brown v.

Illinois, 422 U . S . 590 (1975); Dunaway v. N e w York, 442 U . S . 200

000043

(1979), Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
DATED this ££_ day of October, 1992.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

Attorney for Defendant
NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Monday,
the 26th day of October, 1992, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. before the
honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP.
DATED this ^/

Please govern yourselves accordingly.

day of October, 1992.

s
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Greg Bown at the
office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^^<3ay of October, 1992.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S
STATEMENT TO POLICE AND NOTICE
OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 921900991FS
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP

GARY D. HILFIKER,
Defendant.

MOTION
COMES NOW the defendant, GARY D. HILFIKER, through counsel,
CANDICE A. JOHNSON and LESHIA LEE-DIXON and moves this court to
suppress his confession made while in police custody on April 24,
1992.

Defendant claims that his statement should be suppressed

pursuant to his constitutional protections guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I §12 and
§14 of the Utah State Constitution.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436 (1966), Smith v. Illinois 469 U.S. 91 (1984); and State v.

0U0045

Griffin 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988).
DATED this £/_

day of October, 1992.
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Attorney for
NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Monday,
the 26th day of October, 1992, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. before the
honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP.
DATED this Jtf

Please govern yourselves accordingly.

day of October, 1992.
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Greg Bown at the
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day of October, 1992.
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ADDENDUM C

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

At about 4:00 a.m. on April

24th, 1992, a fire occurred at 434 Bryan Avenue.
Defendant, a resident of said address, was present,
and was discovered by the fire personnel as well as
the police officers.

And around 4:30 a.m. on that

date, the police rendered first aid to the Defendant,
Gary D. Hilfiker.
Following the rendition of first aid,
the Defendant was taken to Holy Cross Hospital for
treatment of a badly or severely lacerated

right

hand •
When the medical treatment at Holy Cress
was completed

and Officer Whitaker started to return

the Defendant back to his home at 434 Bryan Avenue,
Officer Singer

(sic) contacted Whitaker by phone and

directed him to transport the Defendant to the Public
Safety Building.

That occurred

a.m. on April the 24th, 1992.

some time around

6:00

And the Defendant and

Officer Whitaker arrived at the Public Safety Building
sometime shortly after 6:00 a.m., 6:20 a.m., on that
morning.
When Officer Whitaker

indicated

they

were going to the Public Safety Building, the
Defendant was initially excited, and indicated

that

2

0002S0

1

they had found the body and that they thought he did

2

it.

3

Defendant under arrest, asked Defendant to answer some

Officer Whitaker, himself, didn't consider

41 questions and the Defendant said he was willing to
5

talk with someone.

6

When they arrived at the Public Safety

7

Building, Officer Whitaker subsequently turned the

8

Defendant over to Officer Howell sometime after

91

a.m.

10

6:00

Detective Howell, who was with the

11

Homicide Unit, was the assigned detective in charge of

12

the -- first of the fire, and then of the homicide.

13

Around 6:30 a.m., Officer Howell took

14

Defendant

15

Division, and interviewed

16

approximately 10 to 15 minutes.

17
18

MR. BOWN:

the Defendant for

I believe that was the

Robbery Division.

19
20

into an interview room there in the Arson

THE COURT:
stand corrected.
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The Robbery Division, I

Thank you.

The subject matter of that

interview

22

generally related to the searching of the house and

23

the vehicles and the property located at 434 Bryan

241

Avenue.

25

At that point, the officers had found
3

nnn9Ri

1

the body of Marsha Haverty*

2

with blood on it out in the yard.

3

blood on three cars*

4

burn pattern in the building.

5

jacket inside of the cab with blood on it; a white

6

jacket behind the house with blood on it.

7

jackets appeared to have a common logo on them.

81
9
10

They had found a knife
They had found

They had found an accelerant
They had observed a

And the

They had found that there was no forced
entry into the house.

They had found that the

Defendant had blood on his shoes, pants and shirt.

11

They had questioned Defendant, who they

12

knew to be a resident at that address, briefly about

13

how the fire had started.

14

there was not an adequate explanation of his

15

whereabouts for the prior two hours.

16

And during that

interview,

Officer Howell asked Defendant for

17

permission to search the home and the vehicle, and

18

Defendant gave his consent for the search.

19

point, there had had been no Miranda Warning, and

20

nothing

21
22
23

To that

incriminatory had been said.
Officer Howell then went about preparing

the consent document.
At that point, Defendant was moved

to an

24

interview room in the Homicide Division there on the

25

sixth floor of the Public Safety Building.
4
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Defendant was given the Miranda Warning

1

21 as the interview started in the Homicide Section about
6:50 a.m.

3

4

1

Officer Howell advised Defendant he

51 didn't want to let him go until he got more

61 information.
7

He advised Defendant he was detaining

him.

81
9

Officer Howell continued the
interrogation until about 7:15 a.m., even though

10

Defendant had indicated he was tired and wanted to get

11

some sleep.
No incriminatory statements had been

12
13

made .
Defendant had not been placed under

14
15

formal arrest.
Sometime near that time. Officer Howell

16
17

turned the Defendant over to Officer Whitaker (sic),

18

who was in the interrogation room.

19

gave instructions to Officer Alcock to continue the

20

interrogation.

21

interrogation.

22
23

Officer Howell

Officer Alcock continued the

At about 9:00 a.m., the first side of
the tape was full, the tape was turned over and

2 4 Officer Alcock reminded the Defendant again of his
2 5 Miranda Rights.

The interview continued until around
5
r\ i\ A o n o

1

9:14

a.m.

2

A request was made to draw blood from

3

the Defendant.

4

a lawyer now."

5

At that time, Defendant said:

"I want

A few more clarifying questions were

6

asked by Officer Alcock, he terminated the

7

interrogation and asked no more questions about either

8

the fire or the homicide.

9

Defendant made a comment to Alcock that

10

he was hungry, so he and the Defendant went to

11

breakfast

12

downstairs.

13
14

No questions were asked about the fire
or the homicide.

15
IS

in the Public Safety Building Cafeteria

After breakfast, the Defendant and
Alcock returned to the interview room.

17

During the second

interview, there had

18

been discussions about taking Defendant's clothing

19

because of the bloodstains, thereon, and there had

20

been discussions about getting a change of clothes.

21

Evidence had called about that time, and advised

22

they had located a change of clothing for the

23

Defendant so that Defendant's clothing could be

24

examined•

25

that

Officer Alcock was briefly out of the
6
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1

interrogation room, he returned and advised

2

Defendant that the clothing were available and that

3

arrangements could be made to change out of the soiled

4

clothing*

5

At that point, the Defendant

the

indicated

6

to Officer Alcock that he wanted to tell him

7

something.

8
9

Alcock, at that point, left the room to
secure a tape recorder.

He returned with a tape

10

recorder, and reminded the Defendant that the officers

11

had advised him of his rights, which the Defendant

12

acknowledged.

13
14

Officer Alcock then reminded
that he still had the right to an attorney.

15
16

Defendant, following that admonition,
indicated

that it was his wish to go ahead.

17
18
19

Defendant

Thereafter, the Defendant made his
confession.
The Defendant, following the medical

20

treatment, went to the Public Safety Building

21

willingly and voluntarily.

22

incriminatory information, he was advised of -- given

23

the Miranda Warnings.

24
25

Well before he gave any

He voluntarily gave his consent to the
search of his premises and vehicles.
7

ji
2

He
the

end

of

the

3

was

again

reminded

first

tape.

When Officer Zimmerman

4

draw

a blood

5

the interrogation was stopped.

6

sample

and

Officer

7

Defendant

8

relating

9

breakfast;

10

about

11

secured

to

the

although,

for

the

13

room

14

clothing

15

Defendant,

16

Alcock,

17

tell

20

Defendant

for

a

lawyer/

took

discussed
during

a brief

discussion

and

the

aspirins

were

to

the

interrogation

advised

any

and

the

were

Defendant
ready,

provocation

from

(sic)

that

th

the

Officer

that

he w a n t e d

to

something.

him

of

that
his

point.

Miranda

acknowledged

21

Officer
right

asked

arson

returned

the D e f e n d a n t

At
reminded

was

at

(sic) sought to

was

the

hand,

secured

without

18
19

they

Alcock

been

advised

there

rights

hand.

Officer
had

or

his

thereafter,

Nothing

injured

When

him

Alcock,

homicide

Defendant's

and

Defendant

to b r e a k f a s t .

12

to

an

he

attorney.

23

second

24

that he wished to continue.
The

Rights,

Alcock,

his

admonition.

Officer

again,

And

Defendant

Court

Alcock
which

again

the

understood.

22

25

of

finds

reminded

him

notwithstanding

advised

and

Officer

concludes

of

the

Alcock

the

8
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statements, thereafter, were voluntary and not
coerced.
At the time the Defendant was asked to
consent to the search of his home and vehicles, the
officers had probable cause to secure a search
warrant.

Defendant voluntarily gave his permission

for the searches.
Accordingly, the Court concludes, afte
considering the totality of the circumstances, that
Defendant's motion to suppress the confession taken
the Public Safety Building should be denied, and tha
the seizure of the Defendant was done with probable
cause and was not illegal.

